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Abstract 
 
 
 
We develop a model of unforeseen contingencies. These are contingencies 
that are understood by economic agents – their consequences and 
probabilities are known – but are such that every description of such events 
necessarily leaves out relevant features that have a non-negligible impact on 
the parties' expected utilities. Using a simple co-insurance problem as a 
backdrop, we introduce a model where states are described in terms of 
objective features, and the description of an event specifies a finite number of 
such features. In this setting, unforeseen contingencies are present in the co-
insurance problem when the first-best risk-sharing contract varies with the 
states of nature in a complex way that makes it highly sensitive to the 
component features of the states. In this environment, although agents can 
compute expected pay-offs, they are unable to include in any ex-ante 
agreement a description of the relevant contingencies that captures (even 
approximately) the relevant complexity of the risky environment. 
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Unforeseen Contingencies
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
In very many circumstances, economic agents, even though they may understand
the consequences and probabilities associated with the environment in which they
operate, are unable to describe adequately certain complex contingencies that may
arise. Often, the gap between the complexity of the environment and what the agents
are able to describe ex-ante is non-negligible in the sense that it has a significant
impact on the agents’ expected utilities.
These contingencies have often been called “unforeseen” by economists (Tirole
1999, p. 743). It is clear that contingencies that are unforeseen in the sense intuitively
sketched out above cannot possibly be included in any ex-ante contractual agreement
that the agents may contemplate. The resulting contracts are often termed incomplete
by economists (Grossman and Hart 1986).1
The goal of this paper is to provide a formal model of unforeseen contingencies. We
set forth a contractual environment that displays contingencies that are understood
by the contracting agents in the sense that their consequences and probabilities are
known to them, but where every feasible ex-ante description of such events necessarily
leaves out relevant features that have a non-negligible impact on the parties’ expected
utilities. Although the contracting parties are able to carry out expected utility
computations to evaluate their decisions in reaching a contractual agreement, they
are not able to describe ex-ante some relevant future contingencies. Any attempt to
“fill the gap” by describing in more and more detail the relevant set of states will not
even approximate a viable description of the unforeseen contingencies that the agents
face.
1Of course, the fact that a contingency cannot be included in an ex-ante agreement, does not, in
general, imply that the outcome of the contractual situation cannot depend on such a contingency.
This is because of the possible role of ex-post implementation mechanisms (Maskin and Tirole 1999).
We return to this issue at some length in Section 2 below.
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1.2. The Contractual Environment
The first paragraph of this paper is a statement of fact. However, there is a sense in
which it is also not far from an explanation of what precisely an unforeseen contin-
gency is. A model in which ex-ante descriptions of certain contingencies are necessar-
ily significantly less complex than the actual contractual environment, can provide a
possible formal model of unforeseen contingencies. Of course the value of such model
is commensurate to the appeal of the complex environment that it captures, and to
the appeal of the class of feasible descriptions that is considered.
In this subsection, we provide an informal description of the state space that
embodies the uncertainty that the agents face. We then briefly describe the class of
feasible descriptions of a contingency (event) that we consider formally below. We
postpone a discussion of our modelling choices until Subsection 1.3 that follows.
Purely for the sake of simplicity, we focus on two agents who enter a contractual
relationship whose outcome is affected by the realization of a state of nature. To keep
matters simple, we consider a co-insurance problem in which two risk-averse agents
face a random environment that makes it mutually beneficial for them to draw up a
contract to smooth their consumption across states.
We consider a countable infinity of physical states of nature. These states can
be described by means of a language in which a countable infinity of elementary
statements are possible. Each elementary statement represents a particular feature
that can be either present or not in a given state of nature (the sky can be either
“blue” or “not blue”).
Slightly more formally, we work with a model in which each state of nature sn (n =
1, 2, . . .) is characterized by an infinite list of elementary statements {s1n, . . . , sin, . . .}
that determine which features are present in the state. Each feature sin can either be
present (sin = 1) or not (s
i
n = 0) in each state.
Real world situations in which the description of each state is by itself potentially
highly complex abound. Just as an example consider a situation in which the object of
economic interest is the overall configuration of active connections in the US telephone
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system at any one point in time.2 In principle, of course, a finite set of features will
suffice to describe the state of nature in this case. However, for all intents and
purposes such description is not feasible.3
An example involving more familiar ingredients is the description of the “output”
of an academic (on which, for instance, a promotion decision might be based). Of
course, the full set of papers that the academic might write will again in principle
be finite. However, for all intents and purposes the features that fully identify the
academic’s output might be taken again as belonging to an infinite set.
For reasons that we will discuss in detail in Subsection 1.3 below, we work with an
“atomless” measure over our countable state space. Roughly speaking, the probability
of a set of states of nature will be set equal to its “limit frequency” within the state
space. Thus, while any finite set of states will be assigned zero probability by our
measure, an infinite set consisting of say “every third state” will receive a probability
of 1/3.
The set of events that we consider “describable” — or equivalently the set of
contingencies that are not unforeseen (for want of a better term foreseen contingencies
from now on) — is not hard to outline intuitively. A feasible description of an event
in our model is an object that must be finite. In other words a foreseen contingency
is an event that can be fully described with reference to a finite set of the constituent
features of each state. A describable event must be entirely pinned down by a finite
set of statements in the language used to describe the states.
The main result of this paper can be paraphrased as follows. In the set up we
have just briefly outlined, it is possible to envisage events that have a well defined
probability (frequency), but that are not describable (are unforeseen) in the sense
above. Any attempt to capture these events using a finite set of statements in the
language used to describe the states will result in the definition of a set of states that
2This might be relevant for instance to determine the fully contingent pricing of a further con-
nection to be activated on demand.
3For instance, routing of trunk calls is determined by solving a finite set of “local” optimization
problems that take into account a particular subset of the system and proceed “as if” the entire
system is in fact an object of infinite size.
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will significantly differ (with positive measure) from the unforeseen contingency that
we were trying to capture in the first place.
To go back to the familiar turf concerning the output of an academic (an assistant
professor this time), consider the event that she gets tenure. That is consider the set
of states of nature that correspond to an academic output sufficient to obtain tenure
in the candidate’s school. It seems reasonable to assert that any finite description of
the assistant professor’s output will not capture exactly the set of states of nature in
which tenure is given. The probability that the candidate gets tenure if she publishes
one paper in a particular journal is neither 1 nor 0. For m large, the probability that
the candidate gets tenure with m published papers may even be 1. However, surely
the probability of getting tenure with m− 1 published papers is in fact not 0.
1.3. Discussion
Our choice of what constitutes a feasible description of an event (a foreseen contin-
gency) is not hard to justify. Once a language to describe the states is given, it seems
natural and compelling to restrict attention to finite “sentences” in the language.
At this point it is useful to notice two features of our definition of foreseen contin-
gencies. The first is that since we are only restricting our descriptions of events to be
finite, our results below are immune to changes in the elementary statements in the
language that, for instance, re-code feature “1” and feature “14” into a single one. A
finite statement in one language will correspond to a finite statement in the new one
and vice-versa. This immunity to re-coding is a relevant feature in a world in which
languages obviously evolve to capture more efficiently concepts that may once have
been considered complex or difficult. A contract concerning the content of an e-mail
message would have required a much larger number of words 10 years ago than it
does now.
The second feature of our definition of a foreseen contingency is that clearly it
yields results that must hold in a world in which each statement in the language is
associated with a cost. In fact any cost function of the number of statements that
guarantees that an infinite number of statements is infinitely costly must yield results
4
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that are at least as strong as the ones that we present below. Of course restricting
attention only to finite statements also affords us the luxury of not having to specify
what the (inevitably arbitrary, and possibly sensitive to re-coding) form of the cost
function of longer statements in the language might be.
We are now ready to turn to a discussion of our modelling choices concerning
the state space that we have described above. There are two issues of concern. The
cardinality of the state space, and the atomless probability measure that we place on
it.
The set of possible states of nature is countably infinite in our model. The reason
why an infinity of states is needed to model a complex world is an obvious one. If
the set of states is finite, then only finitely many features of each state can possibly
matter. Any two states can be “separated” by identifying finitely many of their
constituent features. Thus the restriction that a foreseen contingency must use only
a finite number of features would have no bite in a model with finitely many states.4
Intuitively, the reason we work with a countable infinity of states rather than a
continuum is as follows. It turns out to be the case that if we consider a continuum
of states, those contingencies for which expected utility can be computed are also
those that can be handled (at least approximately) by agents who are restricted to
condition on foreseen contingencies alone. Roughly speaking this is because, with a
continuum of states, those ex-ante agreements that can be “integrated” to yield well
defined expected utility values are also those agreements that can be approximated
by a sequence of (step functions) agreements that specify foreseen contingencies alone
(Anderlini and Felli 1994).5
Any “standard” (countably additive) probability measure over a countable set also
poses a problem to model the complex world that we try to capture here. Suppose
that we were to place a countably additive probability measure over our state space.
4Of course this would no longer be true in a model in which “writing costs” are explicitly modelled
(Anderlini and Felli 1999, Battigalli and Maggi 2002). As we mentioned above, modelling such costs
is something we specifically want to avoid here.
5We return to this point in Section 2 below.
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Then we could be sure to find a finite subset of the state space that “approximates”
the entire set of possible states in the sense that whatever is left out has arbitrarily
small probability. Therefore, in this world, the agents could approximate whatever
is best for them by effectively considering a finite problem. But, as we noted above,
once we are dealing with a finite problem, only finitely many features of each state can
possibly matter. Hence, the restriction to conditioning only on foreseen contingencies
would have no bite in this case.
To avoid the “approximation” problem that we have just outlined, we choose to
work with an atomless (finitely additive) probability measure over our countable state
space.
1.4. Overview
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. We begin by reviewing some related
literature in Section 2. In Section 3 we set up the co-insurance problem we use as a
backdrop and derive the benchmark efficient allocation that the parties can achieve
in the absence of any constraint. We then define the state space that we described
intuitively above, and the associated probability measure in Section 4. In Section 5 we
proceed to give a formal definition of the notion of a finite contract. In Section 6 we
piece together all these elements and proceed to evaluate the parties’ expected utilities
associated with any finite contract. Section 7 presents our first batch of results: we
show that for some instances of our basic co-insurance problem the only transfers
that the parties would like to specify are contingent on unforeseen contingencies. As
a consequence, the optimal finite contract is to specify no transfers at all: the no-
contract outcome obtains. Sections 8 and 9 generalize the results of Section 7 to the
case in which some of the variability of the environment can be captured by a finite
contract, but a non-negligible amount of uncertainty cannot be captured in this way.
In Section 8 we consider a continuous “smoothed” contracting problem that can be
associated with every instance of our basic co-insurance problem with a countable
state space, and we establish some of its basic properties. In Section 9 we use the
tools developed in Section 8 to characterize the shape of optimal finite contracts in the
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general case for our basic co-insurance problem. Section 9 also includes two leading
examples of how our tools can be used to characterize optimal finite contracts in
specific cases. Section 10 concludes the paper. For ease of exposition, all proofs have
been relegated to the Appendix.6
2. Related Literature
The intuitive notion of a contingency that is “[...]prohibitively difficult to think about
and describe unambiguously in advance” (Grossman and Hart 1986, p. 696) has been
extensively used in the contracting literature. In short, if we take as given that
some contingencies cannot be included in an ex-ante agreement (although their conse-
quences and probabilities are understood by the agents), and therefore that contracts
are incomplete, we can then focus on the institutional arrangements that may reduce
the inevitable inefficiencies that are associated with this lack of detail of the ex-ante
contracts that the parties draw up.
This line of research has proved extremely fertile. Among other things, it has
afforded important insights concerning the boundaries of a firm (Grossman and Hart
1986), the allocation of ownership rights over physical assets (Hart and Moore 1990),
the allocation of authority (Aghion and Tirole 1997) and power (Rajan and Zingales
1998) in organizations and the judicial role of the courts of law (Anderlini, Felli, and
Postlewaite 2001).
Perhaps precisely because of its prominence and usefulness in modelling a wide
range of economic phenomena, the plain assumption that contracting agents may face
some contingencies that are unforeseen has itself been the subject of intense scrutiny
in a number of recent papers. It seems useful to distinguish between two literature
strands here. One that investigates the foundations of the notion of unforeseen con-
tingencies in a contractual set-up, and one that addresses the necessary effects on
the contractual outcomes that can be achieved when unforeseen contingencies are
present.7
6In the numbering of equations, definitions, remarks and so on, a prefix of “A” indicates that the
relevant item is to be found in the Appendix.
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This paper is a contribution to the literature that concerns the foundations of
the notion of an event that has known consequences and probabilities but which is
impossible to include in an ex-ante agreement.8
Anderlini and Felli (1994) and Al-Najjar (1999) are two existing contributions
that are closely related to the results presented here.
In Anderlini and Felli (1994), the contracting parties are restricted to ex-ante
agreements that are finite in a sense that is analogous to the one we postulate in
this paper. However, crucially, in Anderlini and Felli (1994), there is a continuum
of states of nature. One of the results reported there is the so-called approximation
result: in a model with a continuum of states, under general conditions of continuity,
the restriction that only finitely many of the constituent features of a state of nature
can be included in any ex-ante agreement has a negligible impact on the parties’
expected utilities.
The restriction to finite agreements clearly precludes the agents from writing some
possible ex-ante contracts.9 Intuitively, the reason why the impact of this restriction
is in fact negligible lies in the requirement that the parties must be able to compute
the expected utilities that an ex-ante agreement generates. In short, if an ex-ante
agreement yields well defined expected utilities to the contracting parties, then it
must yield them utility levels that are “integrable” as a function of the state of
nature. Since a function that is integrable can always be approximated by a sequence
of step functions, it is now enough to notice that (a “sufficiently rich” set of) step
7It should be noted at this point that the term “unforeseen contingencies” has also been used
in a number of decision-theoretic and epistemic models (see for instance Kreps (1992), and more
recently Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) and the survey in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini
(1998)). Once again, here we are using the term unforeseen contingency in a restricted sense. Our
contracting parties understand (have common knowledge of) the consequences and probabilities
of unforeseen contingencies. They are simply unable to describe them in advance and hence to
incorporate them in any ex-ante agreement.
8Anderlini and Felli (2000) contains a partial review of the literature that links the notion of
complexity costs to that of contractual incompleteness as generated by unforeseen contingencies.
9A simple counting argument suffices to prove this point. It is easy to see that in the world of
Anderlini and Felli (1994) there are countably many possible finite ex-ante contracts, while there
are uncountably many possible ex-ante agreements.
8
Unforeseen Contingencies
functions can be viewed as finite ex-ante agreements.
The key differences between the analysis in Anderlini and Felli (1994) and the
results that we report below is that the approximation result does not hold in the
model we analyze here. Intuitively the stark difference between the two environments
can be traced to the cardinality of the state space (countable versus continuous) and
the nature of the associated probability measure (finitely additive “frequencies” in
this paper, “standard” probability measures over the interval [0, 1] in Anderlini and
Felli (1994)).
In Al-Najjar (1999) the state space is akin to the one used here: it is discrete and
is equipped with finitely additive “frequencies,” as in the analysis below. Using this
apparatus, in a very different set-up from the one analyzed below, Al-Najjar (1999)
addresses the question of whether competitive differences between agents get washed
out by imitation. Roughly speaking, imitation is limited to those features that can
be finitely defined. In a model with a continuum of states it is possible to show
that the performance of a successful agent can be replicated asymptotically as more
and more data become available: a version of the approximation result described
above holds in this case. However, in a complex environment (embodied in a state
space similar to the one used in the present paper) imitation does not eliminate all
competitive advantages, even in the limit when an arbitrarily large amount of data
becomes available.
Two further papers have investigated contractual environments in which the ap-
proximation result described above fails. The analysis in both Anderlini and Felli
(1998) and Krasa and Williams (1999) centers on the observation that the approxima-
tion result in Anderlini and Felli (1994) requires the parties utilities to be continuous
in an appropriate way. The focus of Anderlini and Felli (1998) is to characterize the ef-
fects of discontinuities in the parties’ utilities in a principal-agent model in which only
finite agreements are allowed. Krasa and Williams (1999) focus on a condition that
they label “asymptotic decreasing importance” which, in their model, is necessary
and sufficient for the required continuity conditions, and hence for the approximation
result, to hold. By contrast, in this paper the parties’ utilities are assumed to be
9
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continuous in outcomes. The fact that the approximation result fails in our model
below is not due to any form of discontinuity in the agents’ preferences.
Using the contribution by Hart and Moore (1988), as their point of departure
Maskin and Tirole (1999) have highlighted a tension between the restrictions that
the agents face in drawing up an ex-ante agreement and their impact on the possible
contractual outcomes ex-post.10 Hart and Moore (1988) analyze an environment in
which there are unforeseen contingencies and all payoffs and their probabilities are
common knowledge between the contracting parties. Maskin and Tirole (1999) argue
that this does not necessarily impose any restrictions on the outcomes (payoffs) that
the contracting parties can achieve ex-post.
In short, Maskin and Tirole (1999) argue that, instead of relying on an infeasi-
ble ex-ante description of all relevant contingencies, the parties can write an ex-ante
contract that commits them to playing an ex-post revelation game. In this revelation
game the players are required to report the payoff relevant information associated
to the realized states or any uniquely defined coding of this information. Provided
that the coding is common knowledge, the game can be designed so that the parties
in equilibrium report the truth, and the allocation implemented by such a mecha-
nism coincides with the allocation implemented by the contract that is optimal in
the absence of any unforeseen contingencies. In other words, an ex-post implementa-
tion mechanism allows the parties to render the realized outcome contingent on the
unforeseen contingencies that at an ex-ante stage the parties could not describe.
This paper provides a formal foundation for the notion of unforeseen contingencies
that fits the environment considered by Hart and Moore (1988) and Maskin and
Tirole (1999). If we are in a world in which the Maskin and Tirole (1999) “critique”
applies, then our contribution can be viewed as providing a rigorous model in which
any efficient outcome must necessarily be implemented ex-post using a message game
(Moore and Repullo 1988, Maskin and Tirole 1999). If, on the other hand, the relevant
environment is one to which the Maskin and Tirole (1999) critique does not apply,
10Tirole (1999) provides an authoritative account of the state of this literature and the debate
that it has generated.
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then our results below can be viewed as a foundation for contractual agreements that
are genuinely incomplete.
We conclude our discussion of related literature by recalling that the possibility of
renegotiation tempers the benefits to the contracting parties of an ex-post implemen-
tation mechanism. If the contracting parties are allowed to write message-contingent
mechanisms but they cannot commit ex-ante not to renegotiate the agreed mechanism
if an ex-post mutually beneficial opportunity arises, the gain from these mechanisms
may be greatly reduced as the complexity (Segal 1999, Hart and Moore 1999) or
symmetry (Reiche 2001) of the environment increases. In particular Segal (1999) an-
alyzes an environment in which all “states of nature” have an equal probability and
an equal impact on the complexity of the message game the parties optimally commit
to. Hence as the number of states of nature (the number of “widgets” in his case)
increases without bound, the welfare benefits of the message game decrease asymp-
totically to zero. In the limit the parties’ welfare coincides with their welfare in the
absence of any ex-ante contract. The state space that we consider in this paper could
be embedded in a different contracting model to formalize the limit world of Segal
(1999). Although our analysis abstracts from the message contingent mechanism, we
propose an environment with a countable infinity of states of nature in which the
parties cannot approximate the first best by focusing on any finite subset of states.
3. The Contracting problem
For the sake of concreteness, throughout the paper we work using a standard co-
insurance problem as backdrop. Two risk-averse agents, labelled i = 1, 2 face a risk-
sharing problem. The uncertainty in the environment is captured by the realization
of a state of nature, denoted by s; the set of all possible states of nature is denoted by
S. The preferences of agent i are represented by the state contingent utility function
Ui : R× S → R. For simplicity only, we assume that the agents’ utilities depend on
s only according to whether or not s falls in a subset Z of the state space S.
The two agents can agree to a state-contingent monetary transfer t ∈ R, which
by convention represents a payment from 2 to 1. We write the utility of 1 in state s,
11
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if the transfer is t as
U1(t, s) =
{
V (1 + t) if s ∈ Z
V (t) if s ∈ Z (1)
where Z denotes the complement of Z in S. Party 2’s utility in state s is instead
written as
U2(t, s) =
{
V (−t) if s ∈ Z
V (1− t) if s ∈ Z (2)
where V : R → R is a twice differentiable, increasing and strictly concave function
satisfying the Inada conditions
lim
y→−1
V ′(y) = +∞, lim
y→+1
V ′(y) = 0.
Ex-ante, 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract t : S → R to 2, where
t(s) is the monetary transfer from 2 to 1 if state s is realized. Of course, 1’s take-it-
or-leave-it offer to 2 will have to satisfy a participation constraint for 2 which will be
specified shortly.
The co-insurance problem we have just described is a completely standard one.
Since in (1) and (2) we have specified the agents utilities so that complete insurance
is in fact feasible, in the absence of any additional restrictions, the optimal contract
t∗(·) will involve only two levels of transfers tZ and tZ with
t∗(s) =
{
tZ if s ∈ Z
tZ if s ∈ Z
(3)
and 1 + tZ = tZ so that
U1(t(s), s) = V (1 + tZ) = V (tZ) ∀ s ∈ S (4)
and
U2(t(s), s) = V (−tZ) = V (1− tZ) ∀ s ∈ S (5)
Agent 2’s participation constraint can be easily specified if we define the proba-
12
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bility p = Pr{s ∈ Z} that s falls in Z. In the absence of any agreed transfers 2’s
expected utility is pV (0)+ (1− p)V (1). Since 2 is the recipient of a take-it-or-leave-it
offer, his participation constraint will bind. Therefore, in addition to (4) and (5) the
optimal contract t∗(·) is characterized by
pV (−tZ) + (1− p)V (1− tZ) = pV (0) + (1− p)V (1) (6)
Clearly, equations (4), (5) and (6) uniquely pin down the values of tZ and tZ , so
that the characterization of the solution to our co-insurance problem in the standard
case is complete.
4. States and Probabilities
We are now ready to proceed with a formal description of our state space S and the
associated probability measure µ.
As we mentioned above, both of these ingredients of our model are not of a
standard form. They are building blocks of a world in which details, no matter how
small, can matter a lot. The inability to capture these details in any finite ex-ante
agreement is at the center of our model of unforeseen contingencies.
4.1. The State Space
We think of there being a countable infinity of physical states of the world S =
{s1, . . . , sn, . . .}.
The parties have a common language to describe each state sn. The language
consists of a countable infinity of elementary statements (characteristics) that can
be true or false about each state of nature sn. Hence the complete description of a
state of nature sn can be thought of as an infinite sequence {s1n, . . . , sin, . . .} of 0’s and
1’s. Each element of the sequence is simply interpreted as reporting whether the i-th
elementary statement is true (sin = 1) or false (s
i
n = 0) about state sn.
The formal definition of our state space simply encapsulates what we have stated
so far about S.
13
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Definition 1. State Space: The state space S is a countably infinite set {s1, s2,
. . . sn, . . .}. Each sn is in turn an infinite sequence of the type {s1n, . . . , sin, . . .} with
sin ∈ {0, 1} for every i and n.
4.2. Probabilities
The second ingredient that is crucial to our model of unforeseen contingencies is the
probability measure over the set of possible states of nature S. Again, our goal is to
model a world in which small details can have a non-negligible impact on the contract
that the parties would like to draw-up and hence on their expected utilities.
Any countably additive probability measure p(·) over a countable set like S cannot
be “atomless” in the following obvious sense. For every ξ > 0 we can find n such
that
∑∞
n=n p(sn) < ξ. It follows that (provided utilities are bounded below) the risk-
sharing problem we described in Section 3 above can be approximated arbitrarily
closely by considering a finite problem that ignores all states of nature sn with n ≥ n.
The expected utility loss from a contract that prescribes an arbitrary sharing of
surplus for all but finitely many states is proportional to ξ.11 Since only finitely
many states matter, it is now clear that only finitely many features of each state can
possibly matter in the contracting problem. A finite set of features will be sufficient
to “distinguish” between any two states in the relevant finite set. Hence, with a
countably additive probability measure over S, the features of each state beyond a
certain level have a negligible impact on the contracting problem. Small details are
negligible in some well defined sense.
Therefore, to proceed in our modelling of unforeseen contingencies in which details
matter we have to abandon the requirement that the probability measure we place
over S is countably additive, and consider a genuinely atomless, finitely additive,
probability measure. Our first step is to define the density of a set of states.
11This is the basic intuition behind the version of the Approximation Result for the case of a
countable state space with a countably additive probability measure reported in Anderlini and Felli
(2000).
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Definition 2. Density: Given any Q ⊆ S, let χQ denote the indicator function of Q
so that χQ(sn) = 1 if sn ∈ Q and χQ(sn) = 0 if sn 6∈ Q. We define the density of Q
to be
µ(Q) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
χQ(sn) (7)
when the limit in (7) exists. The density is otherwise left undefined. We denote by
D the collection of subsets of S that have a well defined density.
Two points should be noted. First of all the density of a set µ(Q) is its “frequency”
in the standard sense of the word. Thus, for instance, every finite set of states has a
density of zero and the set of all “even numbered” states {s2, s4, s6, . . .} has a density
of 1/2. Secondly, the definition of density we have given (both whether the density
of a given set is defined and the value that it takes if it is defined) depends on the
ordering of the states {s1, . . . , sn, . . .}. This ordering is taken as given and fixed
throughout the paper.12
We conclude this subsection with two observations that will become useful below.
First, given two sets Q′ and Q′′ that have well defined densities and such that
µ(Q′) > 0 and µ(Q′ ∩ Q′′) is also well defined, then we can define the conditional
density µ(Q′′ | Q′) as µ(Q′ ∩Q′′)/µ(Q′).
Secondly, if we let Σ be the set of all subsets of S. Then there exists an extension
to Σ of the density µ in Definition 2 above which is a finitely additive probability
measure. In other words
Remark 1. Finitely Additive Probability Measure: There exists a finitely additive
probability measure µ˜ over (S,Σ) that for every set of states B ⊂ S satisfies µ˜(B) =
µ(B), whenever µ(B) is defined.13
12The class of permutations of the states of nature that leave our results unaffected includes all
finite permutations. We do not attempt a general characterization of such permutations in this
paper.
13See, for example, Rao and Rao (1983), p. 41) for a proof.
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5. Finitely Definable Sets and Finite Contracts
The set of ex-ante contracts that our agents can draw up intuitively coincides with
those agreements that are finite in a sense to be defined shortly in a formal way.
There is a further important issue to clarify at this point. We interpret the words
“ex-ante” to mean that a contract prescribes outcomes (transfers) as a function of the
actual realized state. Any other variables cannot be included in an ex-ante agreement
because they cannot be “verified” by an enforcing authority (a court).14
It is convenient to start our description of what a finite contract is by introducing
the notion of a finitely definable set. Intuitively, these are subsets of S that can be
defined referring only to a finite set of their constituent features.
For each state of nature sn, let s
i
n ∈ {0, 1} indicate the value of the i-th feature
of sn. Define also
A(i, j) = {sn ∈ S such that sin = j} (8)
so that A(i, j) is the set of those states of nature that have the i-th feature equal to
j ∈ {0, 1}.
We are now ready to define the set of finitely definable subsets of S.
Definition 3. Finitely Definable Sets: Consider the algebra of subsets of S gener-
ated by the collection of sets of the type A(i, j) defined in (8). Let this algebra be
denoted by A. We refer to any A ∈ A as a finitely definable set.
Elements of A can be obtained by complements and/or finite intersections and/or
finite unions of the sets A(i, j). Hence every element of A can be defined by finitely
many elementary statements about the features of the states of nature that it contains.
14As we remarked above (see our discussion of Maskin and Tirole (1999) in Section 2) the parties
to a contract can attempt to implement the desired outcomes as a function of other (non-verifiable)
variables (e.g. utility levels) committing to an ex-post game. Our focus here is what can be achieved
by means of ex-ante agreements. In a world with unforeseen contingencies as we model here, the
agents may indeed be forced to rely on such ex-post mechanisms to implement certain outcomes.
We come back to this point once again in the concluding section of the paper.
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A suitable definition of a finite contract is now easy to get. The key feature of
a finite contract is that it should specify a set of transfers that is conditional only
on finitely definable sets. For simplicity we also restrict attention to contracts that
specify a finite set of values for the actual transfer t. This is clearly without loss of
generality in our simple co-insurance problem described in Section 3 above.
Definition 4. Finite Contracts: A contract is finite if and only if the transfer rule
t(·) that it prescribes is measurable with respect to A, and takes finitely many values
{t1, . . . , tM}. The set of finite contracts is denoted by F .
Above, we have justified informally the fact that one might want to restrict atten-
tion to finite contracts using the idea that contracts must be finite objects in some
sense. While it is possible to take Definition 4 as a primitive that embodies the notion
of a contract as a finite object, it is important to point out that this requirement can
be supported in a different way (than just taking Definition 4 at face value).
Anderlini and Felli (1994) put forward the idea that it is natural to consider
contracts that yield a value for a sharing rule that is computable by a Turing machine
as a function of the state of nature. The justification for this requirement is a claim
that if a function is computable in a finite number of steps by any imaginable finite
device then it must be computable by a Turing machine.15 Obviously, any finite
contract must be computable. It is also possible to show that the converse holds:
requiring that contracts be finite exhausts the set of all computable contracts. For
reasons of space, we omit any formal analysis of this topic.
6. Computing Expected Utilities
We now have set out all the ingredients of our model. In essence we want to char-
acterize what the agents can achieve using finite contracts when the state space and
associated probability measure are as in Section 4.
15This claim is known in the literature on computable functions as Church’s thesis. See for instance
Cutland (1980), or Rogers (1967).
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As we mentioned already, we want to restrict attention to those cases in which the
agents can base their choices on the expected utility that an ex-ante contract yields.
Since we want the agents to be able to contemplate all possible finite contracts, we
need to ensure that all such contracts can be evaluated in this way. So far, there is
nothing in our framework that guarantees that this is the case. This is because our
Definition 2 above does not, by itself, guarantee that all finitely definable sets have a
well defined density. Our next assumption guarantees that this property holds.
Assumption 1. Densities of Finitely Definable Sets: The state space S is such that
every A ∈ A has a well defined density µ(A). In other words, S is such that A ⊆ D.
Of course, at this point we need to show that a state space S as in Definition 1
that also satisfies Assumption 1 does indeed exist.
Proposition 1. Existence: There exists a state space S as in Definition 1 that sat-
isfies Assumption 1.
The proof of Proposition 1 is a simple consequence of the law of large numbers.
Think of S as a realization of countably many i.i.d. draws from, say, a (countably
additive) density µˆ over {0, 1}N. It is then sufficient to observe that the law of large
numbers guarantees that, with probability one, the fraction of draws that falls into
any finitely definable set A is in fact well defined and equal to its density µˆ(A). The
set of realizations of these i.i.d. draws that have the properties required to satisfy
Assumption 1 has probability one in the space of realizations of this process. It
then follows that it must be not empty. Hence, setting S to be equal to a “typical”
realization of these i.i.d. draws as described is sufficient to prove the claim.
To evaluate the expected utility accruing to each party from any finite contract
we will also need to refer to the conditional densities of certain events. This is an easy
task if we restrict attention to finitely definable sets. The following remark is stated
without proof since it is a direct consequence of the fact that, by assumption, since A
is an algebra, the intersection of two finitely definable sets is itself finitely definable.
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Remark 2. Well Defined Conditional Densities: Let Assumption 1 hold and let A′
and A′′ be two finitely definable sets with µ(A′) > 0. Then the conditional density
µ(A′′ | A′) is well defined.
In any simple co-insurance problem of the type described in Section 3, the expected
utility that a finite contract yields to the agents is, of course, the result of two maps:
the contract itself, and the way in which the agents’ state-dependent utilities vary
with the state of nature. Therefore, to ensure that the agents’ expected utilities
from any finite contract is well defined we need to further impose a restriction on the
second of these two maps. Clearly, without doing so, it is possible that the agents’
utilities vary with the state of nature in a way that makes it impossible to assign a
frequency to the contract prescribing a certain transfer t conditional on the state of
nature belonging to a particular set on which the agents’ utilities depend.
Notice that, a stronger restriction on the way that the agents’ utilities depend on
the state of nature will make our results below stronger rather than weaker. This is
because our results will show that the agents’ utilities can be made to depend on the
state in such a way that any finite contract is unable to capture (all or a significant
part) of such variability. Clearly, the smaller the class of state-dependent utilities to
which we refer, the stronger the result.
It is useful to start with an abstract definition of what it means for a function
to vary with the state of nature so that its frequencies can be computed, conditional
on any finitely definable set. This, roughly speaking, is the maximum rate of state-
dependence that we will allow for the agents’ utilities.
Consider a function f : S → {f1, . . . , fM} and denote Fi = f−1(fi), for i ∈
{1, . . . ,M} the inverse images of each of the values fi. Then we say that the func-
tion f(·) has well-defined frequencies if it is possible to compute the density of Fi,
conditional on any finitely definable set.
Definition 5. Well-Defined Frequencies: The function f : S → {f1, . . . , fM} has
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well defined frequencies if
Fi ∩ A ∈ D ∀ A ∈ A, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}
in other words the inverse image sets of f have densities, conditional on any finitely
definable set A (provided of course that µ(A) > 0).
We have now introduced all the elements that will allow us to study a class of
co-insurance problems in which unforeseen contingencies can arise, and in which the
expected utilities for both agents from any finite contract are well defined and can be
computed in a simple way.
The fact that unforeseen contingencies can arise in this model is the subject of
our next section. For the time being, we remark that the expected utilities from any
finite contract are well defined.
Our next statement takes the shape of a definition (rather than a proposition)
since we are in fact defining what the natural meaning of expected utilities is in a
world in which probabilities are equated with the densities of Definition 2 above.
Definition 6. Expected Utilities: Consider the co-insurance problem described in
Section 3. Let a density µ as in Definition 2 be given and let Assumption 1 hold.
Assume further that the function f : S → {0, 1} defined as f(s) = 1 if s ∈ Z and
f(s) = 0 if s ∈ Z has well defined frequencies in the sense of Definition 5. Let also
any finite contract t : S → {t1, . . . , tM} be given. Then the expected utility to agent
1 from contract t is defined as
EU1(t) =
M∑
i=1
V (1 + ti)µ[t
−1(ti) ∩ Z] +
M∑
i=1
V (ti)µ[t
−1(ti) ∩ Z ] (9)
while 2’s expected utility is
EU2(t) =
M∑
i=1
V (−ti)µ[t−1(ti) ∩ Z] +
M∑
i=1
V (1− ti)µ[t−1(ti) ∩ Z ] (10)
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We conclude this section with an observation. Using the finitely additive probabil-
ity measure µ˜ of Remark 1 that extends µ to all subsets of S it is possible to compute
the density of every set D ∈ Σ. This in turn would allow us to compute the expected
utility of a much broader class of contracts that are not necessarily finite, allowing
also for a much broader class of state-dependent utilities. Of course, to do this we
would need a way to integrate a much broader class of functions f : S → R with
respect to µ˜. Fortunately, there is an elaborate theory of integration with respect
to finitely additive probabilities, which for the most part is analogous to the usual
theory of integration.16
In this paper, we restrict attention to contracts that are measurable with respect
to A. Of course, when we restrict attention to this case, the more general type of
integration that we are referring to gives exactly the expected utilities that we have
defined above.
To simplify matters further, we also restrict attention (without any loss in gen-
erality in our co-insurance setup) to contracts that take a finite number of values.
It should be noted, however, that the restriction to finitely-valued functions, is in-
troduced only for expository simplicity; our analysis is applicable more generally
(although this would require some additional machinery).
7. Unforeseen Contingencies
7.1. Finite Invariance and Fine Variability
In contrast to the cases of a continuous state space and of a countable state space with
a countably additive probability measure, finite contracts cannot always approximate
the first best in the model we have set-up here. The idea is the allocation t∗ that
the agents may be trying to attain could exhibit “fine” variability as a function of
the state of nature. Any finite contract is bound not to capture part (or all) of this
16Dunford and Schwartz (1958) is a classic textbook which provides a unified treatment of inte-
gration for both finite and countably additive measures. A more specialized treatment can be found
in Rao and Rao (1983).
21
Unforeseen Contingencies
variability. It is important to stress again that this is in fact possible when the state-
dependence of the agents’ preferences is such that the expected utility of any finite
contract (Definition 6) is well defined.
We begin with two abstract definitions that capture the idea that in the model we
have set up it is possible that a function f : S → {f1, . . . , fM} may “look the same”
if we look at its restriction over any finitely definable set, but at the same time may
vary “finely” with the state of nature. It will be precisely this type of fine variability
that finite contracts cannot capture and hence give rise to unforeseen contingencies
below.
Definition 7. Finite Invariance: Let f : S → R be a function that takes finitely
many distinct values {f1, . . . , fM} ∈ RM and let Fi = f−1(fi) for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
We say that f displays finite invariance over A (with µ(A) > 0) if for every subset
A′ ⊆ A such that A′ ∈ A and µ(A′) > 0,
µ(Fi|A′) = µ(Fi|A) ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} (11)
So, f displays finite invariance over A, if the densities of the sets Fi are the same,
conditional on all finitely definable sets that are subsets of A.
In other words, if f displays finite invariance over, say, the whole of S, knowing
that s belongs to any finitely definable subset of S does not help us to “predict”
better the values that f will take. It should be noted at this point that the possibility
that Definition 7 may have a non-trivial content is a feature of the model we have set
up, which does not hold in say a standard model with a continuum of states when
f is a measurable function of s. In fact, it is clear that in this case if f is finitely
invariant over A then it must be (essentially) constant over A. This is not the case
in our model, as we will demonstrate shortly in Proposition 2 below.
The second abstract definition that we state is a property that we label fine
variability: roughly speaking this is a measure of the degree of variability of a finitely-
valued function that displays finite invariance.
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Definition 8. Fine Variability: Let f : S → {f1, . . . , fM} finitely invariant over
A ∈ A with µ(A) > 0 be given.
We say that f(·) displays fine variability of degree v ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1} over A
if and only if there are v + 1 elements of the range of f that have positive density
conditional on A.
In other words µ(Fi|A) > 0 for v + 1 distinct Fi’s.
The properties that we have just defined may simultaneously hold for a function
that is also well defined in terms of frequencies.
Our next proposition asserts that, for some state spaces S satisfying Assumption
1 even though a function may be well defined in terms of frequencies and display
finite invariance over a finitely definable set A, it may be far from being constant
over A. In other words, f may be well defined in terms of frequencies and display
finite invariance over A, but at the same time exhibit an arbitrary amount of fine
variability over the same set A.
Proposition 2. Finite Invariance and Fine Variability: There exists an S such that
the following is true.
Let v ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1} and any (p1, . . . , pM) ∈ ∆M−1 be given.17 Let also A ∈ A
be given, with µ(A) > 0.
Then there exists a function f : S → {f1, . . . , fM} with well defined frequencies
that displays both finite invariance and fine variability of degree v over A. Moreover
the density of Fi = f
−1(fi) conditional on A is equal to pi for every i = 1, . . . ,M .
The formal proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix. Here we sketch the argument
in the simple case in which f takes only two values {f1, f2}, A = S and p1 = p2 = 1/2.
Let S be as in Proposition 1. We can then construct the function f in the following
way. For each given state of nature sn ∈ S we set f(sn) equal to f1 or f2 with equal
17Here, and throughout the rest of the paper the notation ∆M−1 denotes the (M −1)-dimensional
simplex in RM .
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probability, and with i.i.d draws across all the states sn. The law of large numbers
again guarantees that we can take f to be a “typical” realization of this process to
prove the claim.
In fact, in any such typical realization, the law of large numbers ensures that the
event “the function f takes value fi” has a density that is well defined and is equal to
1/2 conditional on any finitely definable subset of states. This clearly guarantees that
f exhibits both finite invariance and fine variability of degree 1, as well as displaying
well defined frequencies, as required.
As we mentioned above, the type of fine variability that is found in Proposition 2
is at the root of our model of unforeseen contingencies. Our next task is to examine
its impact on the simple co-insurance model described in Section 3 above.
7.2. Unforeseen Contingencies and Fine Variability
The possibility that the contract t∗ in the co-insurance problem described in Section
3 above may have the fine variability described in Proposition 2 has far reaching
consequences on what the contracting parties can achieve by means of a finite contract.
In this section, we characterize the impact of fine variability in its simplest form
— namely when it is associated with finite invariance over the entire state space. In
this case, any finite contract will be unable to capture any of the fine variability of t∗.
As a consequence the agents will choose a trivial contract that prescribes a transfer
of t = 0 in every possible state. This is of course the same as saying that no contract
will be drawn up.
Consider the co-insurance problem described in Section 3. For a given S, µ and
Z, let t∗∗ be the optimal finite co-insurance contract, if it exists. In other words, if it
is well defined let t∗∗ be the solution to
max
t
EU1(t)
s.t. EU2(t) ≥ µ(Z)V (0) + µ(Z)V (1)
t ∈ F
(12)
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where EUi(t) are the parties’ expected utilities as in Definition 6 above.
Proposition 3. Optimal Finite Contract I: Consider the co-insurance problem de-
scribed in Section 3. Then there exist an S, µ and Z with µ(Z) ∈ (0, 1) with the
following properties.
1. The characteristic function of Z is well defined in terms of frequencies.
2. The optimal finite contract t∗∗ that solves problem (12) exists unique, up to a set
of states of µ-measure zero.
3. The optimal finite contract t∗∗ prescribes no transfer between the agents in every
state of nature. In other words t∗∗(s) = 0 for every s ∈ S, up to a set of states of
µ-measure zero.
Once again the formal proof of Proposition 3 is presented in the Appendix. Intu-
itively, Proposition 3 is a fairly direct consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 coupled
with the strict concavity (in t) of the agents’ preferences.
Again, we start with an S as in Proposition 1. Recall now that in the co-insurance
problem described in Section 3 above the parties are able to achieve full insurance
by agreeing on a transfer contingent on the event Z. We now choose the event Z
so that its characteristic function exhibits finite invariance and fine variability as in
Proposition 2 over the whole of S. Let pZ and pZ be the densities of Z and Z
respectively, conditional on any A ∈ A.
Notice that by definition of finite invariance the event Z has been defined so that
any attempt by the parties to condition on a finite set of characteristics (the only
feasible ex-ante description available to them) will leave them with a set of states
of which only a fraction pZ actually belongs to Z. This is true whatever finitely
definable subset of S the parties decide to condition their contract on. The fact
that the parties are risk averse now implies that the optimal finite contract should
specify the same transfer from 2 to 1 contingent on any finitely definable subset of
S. Any transfer function that varies across two finitely definable sets of states will
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be strictly dominated (in terms of the parties expected utility) by a constant transfer
that coincides with the average of the transfer function we started from.
The optimal contract t∗∗ is now immediately obtained from the observation that
the only constant (across all states) transfers from 2 to 1 that are compatible with 2’s
participation constraint are non-positive. Since 1’s expected utility is monotonically
increasing in the constant transfer from 2, the optimal finite contract must clearly
prescribe a transfer of 0 in all states.
The allocation entailed by the optimal finite contract coincides with the no-
contract outcome. Clearly the fact that the two parties to the contract are strictly
risk averse implies that party 1’s expected utility associated with the no-contract
outcome is bounded away from the full-insurance contract t∗ described in Section 3.
In our terminology, the event Z is an unforeseen contingency. The agents under-
stand its probability pZ and use it in their expected utility computations. However,
no matter how finely they attempt to describe it in a finite ex-ante agreement, they
will only be correct a fraction pZ of the time. The extreme prediction that the par-
ties will choose an allocation equivalent to no-contract of course derives from the
particular event Z we constructed above.
8. The Discrete and the Continuous State Spaces
Our next task in this paper is to characterize tightly optimal finite contracts in a
more general case that we have done so far. In particular we would like to “solve” our
basic contracting problem in the more general case in which f — the characteristic
function of Z — exhibits fine variability but not necessarily finite invariance.
We attack this problem directly in Section 9 below. In this section we develop
some of the tools that are needed for this task. For reasons that will be apparent
below, we need to investigate the relationship between a given contracting problem in
our discrete state space S and a closely related problem formulated in a continuous
state space.
Recall that our state space S is a countable set of sequences of 0s and 1s. It
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is clearly a natural question to ask what happens if we consider instead the set
Sˆ ≡ {0, 1}N of all binary sequences.18
To proceed with the translation of our basic contracting problem into one on the
continuous state space Sˆ, we begin with a basic observation: every elementary set of
the form A(i, j), has a natural image in Sˆ ≡ {0, 1}N. Formally, define
Aˆ(i, j) = {s ∈ Sˆ such that si = j} (13)
Clearly, A(i, j) = Aˆ(i, j) ∩ S, so there is a natural one-to-one correspondence
between elementary sets in the two models. Intuitively, one may think of this cor-
respondence as follows: A(i, j) and Aˆ(i, j) are representations in two different state
spaces of the same statement, namely “the set of states where feature i takes value
j.” This statement makes sense independently of the set of physical states. Note also
that the identification of elementary sets in S and Sˆ extends to the algebras they
generate. Thus, the algebra Aˆ generated by all sets of the form Aˆ(i, j), corresponds
in a natural way to the algebra A through the relationship: Aˆ ∈ Aˆ if and only if
Aˆ ∩ S ∈ A.
We now introduce the main idea of this section: every contracting problem in the
discrete model has a unique, natural extension to a contracting problem on Sˆ.
Recall that our basic co-insurance problem (12) is defined by three elements: the
state space S, the measure µ over S and the set Z, or equivalently its characteristic
function f .
Our first result is that we can find a measure µˆ and a measurable19 function fˆ on
18The space Sˆ is closely related to [0,1], as can be seen by viewing each element of Sˆ as a binary
expansion of a real number. There are two formal differences, however. First, some real numbers
have more than one binary expansion, so two points in Sˆ may correspond to the same real number
in [0,1]. However, this happens for only a countable number of points in [0,1], which is negligible if
one takes a diffuse measure, such as the uniform distribution. Second, the usual metric on [0,1] is
generated by a specific order of the features, while no such order is implied in the definition of Sˆ.
19Here and in the rest of the paper, all measurability statements about functions defined on Sˆ are
with respect to the σ-algebra generated by Aˆ, which is in fact the Borel σ-algebra generated by the
product topology on Sˆ. This is easily seen by noting that Aˆ is a base for the product topology on
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Sˆ which “replicate” µ and f in the following sense.
Proposition 4. Continuum Extension: Let S be a (discrete) state space as in Defi-
nition 1, and assume that S satisfies Assumption 1. Let µ be the (finitely additive)
density (measure) of Definition 2. Let Z ⊆ S be a subset of states in S and assume
that the characteristic function f of Z has well defined frequencies in the sense of
Definition 5.
For every pair (f, µ) as above, there is a unique countably additive measure µˆ on
Sˆ ≡ {0, 1}N and a measurable function fˆ : Sˆ → IR, unique (up to equivalence), such
that
µ(A) = µˆ(Aˆ) for every A ∈ A (14)
and ∫
A
fdµ =
∫
Aˆ
fˆdµˆ for every A ∈ A (15)
where for any A ∈ A, Aˆ denotes the corresponding set in the algebra Aˆ as given by
(13) above.
Given any triple (S, f, µ), we call the pair (fˆ , µˆ) its extension to the continuum.20
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the Appendix. Besides being useful to character-
ize optimal finite contracts in the more general case considered in the next section,
Proposition 4 sheds light on the nature of our original model with the discrete state
space S.
On the one hand, equation (14) reassures us that the (finitely additive) measure µ
on the state space S must treat all sets in the algebra A in a way that is “compatible”
Sˆ.
20Notice that we map a triple into a pair simply because the state space in the continuous extension
is always Sˆ.
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with a standard countably additive measure µˆ on the continuous state space Sˆ. This
part of Proposition 4 is in fact a consequence of Kolmogorov’s existence theorem.
On the other hand, equation (15) tells us that for some measurable function fˆ , for
any finitely definable set A we can think of the density of Z ∩ A as the integral of
f on the corresponding Aˆ. In some sense, fˆ contains all the information about the
behavior of f , that we can ever hope to capture if we can only condition on finitely
definable sets. Not surprisingly then, if f exhibits finite invariance with µ(Z|A) =
pZ for every A ∈ A, it is immediate from (14) and (15) that we would get fˆ(s) = pZ
for every s ∈ Sˆ.
This last observation highlights a key insight about the nature of fine variability in
our model with discrete state space S. If f does not display finite invariance it is again
immediate from (15) that the corresponding fˆ would not be constant over Sˆ. So, some
of the variability of f may be meaningfully captured preserving measurability with
respect to the algebra A. This part of the variability of f is what can be incorporated
in the corresponding measurable function fˆ . Working with the discrete state space S
allows for (fine) variability that cannot possibly be captured in this way in a model
with the continuous state space Sˆ.
9. Fine Variability Without Finite Invariance
So far we have considered contracting problems that exhibit both fine variability and
finite invariance. This is clearly a canonical extreme case. Proposition 3 tells us that
in this case the optimal finite contract will simply ignore all the variability embodied
in the contracting problem. Finite invariance guarantees that the contracting problem
exhibits no variability that can be usefully captured by any finite contract.
We now ask the question of what optimal finite contracts look like in a contracting
problem that does not necessarily exhibit finite invariance. Clearly, it can still be the
case that some of the variability of the contracting problem is just “too fine” to
be usefully captured by any finite contract. The question that remains, however, is
whether there is any part of the variability of a contracting problem that will be
reflected in optimal finite contracts. If this is the case, can we characterize what part
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of the variability embodied in a contracting problem will in fact be reflected in an
optimal finite contract?
The answer to the above question stems from Proposition 4 above. To know
what part of the variability of the environment will be reflected in the optimal finite
contract in the general case it is sufficient to consider the continuous extension of
the contracting problem to which Proposition 4 refers. In a contracting problem that
does not exhibit finite invariance it will indeed be the case that the optimal finite
contract will not be “flat” as in Proposition 3. Moreover, the optimal finite contract
in the absence of finite invariance can be tightly characterized. As it turns out, using
the continuous extension of the given contracting problem we will able to state basic
first order conditions which completely characterize the optimal finite contract.
9.1. The Contracting Problem and Optimizing Sequences
The contracting problem that we consider here is still the one described in Section 3,
and defined formally in (12). The novelty now is that, because we are not restricting
attention to the case of finite invariance, we are unable to use the concavity arguments
in the proof of Proposition 3 to characterize the optimal finite contract between the
agents.
Indeed, as will be apparent below, once we allow contracting problems without
finite invariance, an optimal finite contract may or may not exist. The possibility
that an optimal finite contract may not exist is due to a simple “closure” problem.
In other words, the contracting problem may be associated with a sequence of finite
contracts that yield higher and higher expected utility to agent 1 (approaching a
finite supremum of course), while still meeting the participation constraint of agent
2. In these cases our results below characterize tightly the “shape” of any sequence
of feasible finite contracts that approaches agent 1’s supremum of expected utility.
Some extra notation is needed to handle this point formally.
Consider again problem (12) above. If a solution to this problem does not exist,
let V ∗∗1 be the supremum of agent 1’s expected utility over the set of contracts that
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satisfy both constraints in problem (12).21 We can now proceed with our next formal
definition.
Definition 9. Optimizing Sequence: Consider the contracting problem (12) above.
Consider now a sequence of finite contracts tn ∈ F that satisfies the first constraint
in problem (12) and such that
lim
n→∞
E U1(tn) = V
∗∗
1 (16)
then we say that tn is an optimizing sequence of finite contracts. Below, an optimizing
sequence of finite contracts will typically be denoted by {t∗∗n }∞n=1.
9.2. Characterization of Optimal Finite Contracts
The characterization of optimal finite contracts (or optimizing sequences) that we
provide in Proposition 5 below is obtained via the solution to the continuous extension
to our original co-insurance problem that we defined in Proposition 4 above.
Before we state our proposition and begin providing some intuition for it, it is
useful to define the class of maximization problem that yields the solution to the
continuous extension that we will use below.
Definition 10. Auxiliary Problem: Consider a triple (S, µ, f) defining a co-insuran-
ce problem as in (12). Assume that (S, µ, f) satisfies the hypotheses of Proposition
4 and, as before, denote by (µˆ, fˆ) it continuous extension.
Let M be the set of all bounded measurable functions on Sˆ.
The auxiliary problem for the original contracting problem is
21Notice that it is trivial that V ∗∗1 is finite.
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max
tˆ∈M
∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆ(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆ(s)] dµˆ
s.t.
∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [−tˆ(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [1− tˆ(s)] dµˆ ≥ µˆ(Z)V (0) + µˆ(Z)V (1)
(17)
Notice that, given the one-to-one correspondence between the sets in the algebras
A and Aˆ that we discussed in Section 8, given a finite contract t : S → R, its
“translation” in the obvious way to the state space Sˆ — typically denoted by tˆ :
Sˆ → R — is unambiguously well defined. In the sequel, when we refer to a contract
tˆ : Sˆ → R as finite, we mean a contract tˆ with a finite range {t1, . . . , tM} and such
that tˆ−1(tj) ∈ Aˆ for every j = 1, . . . ,M . Clearly, its “translation” to the state space
S — typically denoted by t : S → R — is also unambiguously well defined.
We are now ready to state our main characterization result.
Proposition 5. Optimal Finite Contract II: Consider any contracting problem as in
(12). Assume that S satisfies Assumption 1 and that the characteristic function of Z
has well defined frequencies as in Definition 5.
Then the following statements hold for the original problem (S, µ, f) and the
associated auxiliary problem (µˆ, fˆ).
1. The solution tˆ∗∗ to the auxiliary problem exists and is unique up to a set of µˆ-
measure zero of points s ∈ Sˆ.
2. The optimal finite contract t∗∗ for the original problem (S, µ, f) exists, if and only
if there exists a finite contract tˆ∗∗ : Sˆ → R that solves the auxiliary problem (µˆ, fˆ).
3. If there exists a finite contract tˆ∗∗ : Sˆ → R that solves the auxiliary problem (µˆ, fˆ),
then its translation t∗∗ : S → R to the state space S is an optimal finite contract for
the original problem (S, µ, f).
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4. Let {t∗∗n }∞n=1 be any optimizing sequence of contracts for the original problem, and
let tˆ∗∗ denote the (unique up to equivalence) solution to the auxiliary problem. Then
for every A ∈ A, with µ(A) > 0, and corresponding Aˆ ∈ Aˆ
lim
n→∞
E[U1(t
∗∗
n )|A] =
1
µˆ(Aˆ)
∫
Aˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆ∗∗(s)] dµˆ (18)
That is, whether an optimal finite contract exists or not, the expected payoff along
the sequence {t∗∗n }∞n=1 converges to the expected payoff under tˆ∗∗, conditional on any
A ∈ A of positive µ-measure.
As usual, the proof of the proposition is in the Appendix. Intuitively, this result
is a fairly direct consequence of Proposition 4 and of the way we have set up the
auxiliary problem in (17) above. Once we find a solution to the auxiliary problem
tˆ∗∗, if the solution to the original problem were not (at least approximately) equal to
it, then we could easily contradict the fact that tˆ∗∗ is optimal in the first place.
Our last result of this subsection states that the solution to the auxiliary problem
invoked in Proposition 5 is in turn easy to characterize via the associated first order
conditions.
Proposition 6. First Order Conditions: Let any contracting problem as in (12),
identified by the triple (S, µ, f), be given. Assume that S satisfies Assumption 1
and that the characteristic function of Z has well defined frequencies as in Definition
5.
Then the solution to the associated auxiliary problem (µˆ, fˆ) satisfies the following
first order conditions, up to a set of µˆ-measure zero of points s ∈ Sˆ.
fˆ(s)V ′[1 + tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V ′[tˆ∗∗(s)] =
= γ
{
fˆ(s)V ′[−tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V ′[1− tˆ∗∗(s)]
} (19)
where γ is a positive constant.
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Together with the obvious observation that the constraint in (17) must hold with
equality, the first order conditions (19) completely characterize the solution to the
auxiliary problem (17).
The proof of Proposition 6 is a matter of routine, and appears below in the
Appendix to the paper.
9.3. Two Leading Examples
We conclude this section with two examples of how the characterization of optimal
finite contracts (or optimizing sequences) we have just given may be used to solve a
contracting problem with fine variability but without finite invariance.
The first example is easy to describe. We partition the state space S into two
subsets: A0 = A(1, 0) in which Z is more “likely,” and A1 = A(1, 1) in which it is
less likely.22
Therefore, we consider an S that satisfies Assumption 1 and that also satisfies
µ(A0) = q ∈ (0, 1) and µ(A1) = 1− q, together with a Z, and associated f as follows.
For any A ∈ A with A ⊆ A0 we have that µ(Z|A0) = p, while for any A ∈ A with
A ⊆ A1 we have that µ(Z|A1) = p, with 0 < p < p < 1. So, the problem exhibits
finite invariance over A0 and A1 considered separately, but not over the entire state
space S.
Notice that it is immediate that in this case fˆ(s) = p for every s ∈ A0, while fˆ(s)
= p for every s ∈ A1. Therefore, the first order conditions (19) in this case read
p V ′[1 + tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− p ]V ′[tˆ∗∗(s)] =
= γ
{
p V ′[−tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− p ]V ′[1− tˆ∗∗(s)]} ∀ s ∈ A0 (20)
22Therefore, A0 can be thought of as the set of states in which the first feature is equal to 0, while
A1 is the set of states in which it is equal to one. Notice also that, the images Aˆ0 and Aˆ1 in the
continuous state space Sˆ can be, loosely speaking, be thought of as the real intervals [0, 1/2] and
(1/2, 1] respectively.
34
Unforeseen Contingencies
and
p V ′[1 + tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− p ]V ′[tˆ∗∗(s)] =
= γ
{
p V ′[−tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− p ]V ′[1− tˆ∗∗(s)]} ∀ s ∈ A1 (21)
Using (20), (21) and the concavity of V it is a matter of routine to check that tˆ∗∗
must be as follows.
t∗∗(s) =
{
t0 if s ∈ A0
t1 if s ∈ A1
(22)
with t1 < t0.
Intuitively, the two agents face two sources of uncertainty. These are the two
events s ∈ A0 as opposed to s ∈ A1, and s ∈ Z as opposed to s ∈ Z. The first event
is insurable since A0 and A1 are finitely definable sets. Because of the fine variability
that underlies Z, the second cannot be usefully captured by a finite contract, except
for the fact that it is correlated with the first. The optimal co-insurance contract
between the agents then exhibits partial insurance against the event s ∈ A0 as opposed
to s ∈ A1.
Our second leading example involves a co-insurance problem that cannot be par-
titioned (as was the case with our first example above) into subsets within which
finite invariance holds. Typically in this type of problem an optimal finite contract
does not exist. In this case, in the light of Proposition 5, we proceed to characterize
the solution to the auxiliary problem, which we know completely pins down the limit
behavior of any optimizing sequence of finite contracts.
To describe the density µ and the characteristic function f of Z for our second
example, we need to introduce some extra notation first. Let A(s1, . . . , sm) be the set
of states of nature s ∈ S such that the first m digits of each state s are equal to the
finite sequence (s1, . . . , sm), si ∈ {0, 1}. Clearly this set A(s1, . . . , sm) = ⋂mi=1A(i, si)
is finitely definable.
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We consider an S that satisfies Assumption 1 and such that
µ(A(s1, . . . , sm)) =
1
2m
(23)
so that in a well defined sense the distribution of states is “uniform” across the state
space S.23
Intuitively, in this example the likelihood of Z is an increasing function of the
state s. Formally, we let
µ(Z|A(s1, . . . , sm)) =
(
m∑
i=1
si
2i
+
1
2m+1
)
(24)
for every A(s1, . . . , sm), every sequence (s1, . . . , sm) and every m.
It is not hard to see that, given (23) and (24), the auxiliary problem in this case
entails a distribution µˆ that is uniform on {0, 1}N and an fˆ(s) = s.24 Therefore the
first order conditions (19) for the auxiliary problem in this case read
s V ′[1 + tˆ∗∗(s)] + (1− s)V ′[tˆ∗∗(s)] =
= γ
{
s V ′[−tˆ∗∗(s)] + (1− s)V ′[1− tˆ∗∗(s)]} ∀ s ∈ Sˆ (25)
Using the implicit function theorem and the concavity of V (·), the solution to the
auxiliary problem tˆ∗∗(s) must satisfy
d
d s
tˆ∗∗(s) < 0
In the special case V (x) = x − x2/2 some straightforward calculations yield a
23It is implicit in the way we set things up in this example that we add to each s viewed as a
sequence of 0’s and 1’s its interpretation as a real number in [0, 1] by setting the “value” of each
state as a real number equal to
∑m
i=1 s
i/2i. See also footnote 24 below.
24 Without grinding through the tedious details notice that if we let s =
∑m
i=1(s
i/2i) and s =∑m
i=1(s
i/2i) + (1/2m) then µ(A(s1, . . . , sm)) =
∫ s
s
ds and µ(Z|A(s1, . . . , sm)) = ∫ s
s
sds.
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closed-form solution for tˆ∗∗(s). In this case tˆ∗∗(s) is linear and takes the form.25
tˆ∗∗(s) =
1
1 + γ
− s
As in our first example, the parties to our coinsurance problem face an environment
in which risk can be decomposed into two parts. An uncertain state, and a likelihood
of Z that is a function of the state itself. While it is impossible for the parties
to capture directly the event s ∈ Z with any finite contract, they find it mutually
advantageous to make their co-insurance contract reflect the fact that as s increases
so does the likelihood that s does in fact belong to Z.
Using Proposition 5 we know that any sequence of finite contracts that approxi-
mates a risk-sharing arrangement that is both feasible and optimal, in the limit will
behave like the increasing function tˆ∗∗. Even in the limit, the parties will only achieve
partial co-insurance against the risk they are faced with.
10. Conclusions
We have shown that it is possible to construct a contracting environment in which
some contingencies have the following properties. Their probabilities and conse-
quences are understood by all concerned, and all agents involved use this information
to compute expected utilities arising from any possible finite ex-ante contract. Yet
these contingencies are unforeseen in the sense that any attempt to describe them in
a finite ex-ante agreement must fail. The contracting parties cannot describe ex-ante
these contingencies to any degree that will improve their expected utilities relative to
an agreement that ignores them altogether.
Given that these unforeseen contingencies cannot be taken into account ex-ante,
ours may be taken as a model that formalizes the underpinnings of many contributions
in the incomplete contracting literature. On the other hand, following the critique
put forward by Maskin and Tirole (1999) our model may be one of a world in which
the agents are forced to resort to mechanisms that implement the desired outcome
25Notice that clearly 0 < tˆ∗∗(0) = 1/(1 + γ) < 1 and −1 < tˆ∗∗(1) = −γ/(1 + γ) < 0.
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ex-post. In our view, whether the former or the latter is the case depends on many
other details of the situation at hand.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the set Sˆ of infinite sequences of 0s and 1s, Sˆ = {0, 1}N, with
typical element sˆ and let sˆi be the i-th digit of the sequence sˆ. Let also
Aˆ(i, j) = {sˆ ∈ Sˆ such that sˆi = j} (A.1)
Let H denote the set of all infinite sequences {sˆ1, . . . , sˆn, . . .} with sˆn ∈ Sˆ for every n. Let
{s˜n}∞n=1 be an infinite sequence of i.i.d. random variables with (countably additive) distribution µˆ
over Sˆ, and let P be the (product) probability distribution that this yields for H.
For any i and j now consider the event M(i, j) ⊂ H such that lim
N→∞
(1/N)
∑N
n=1 χAˆ(i,j)(sˆn) =
µˆ(Aˆ(i, j)). By the law of large numbers, P (M(i, j)) = 1 for every i and j.
Now define,
M =
⋂
i∈N
j∈{0,1}
M(i, j) (A.2)
Clearly, since P (M(i, j)) = 1 for every i and j, and of course P is countably additive, we must also
have P (M) = 1, and therefore M 6= ∅.
It is now sufficient to choose S to be equal to any element of M to prove the claim.
Proof of Proposition 2: Fix (p1, . . . , pM ) as in the statement of the proposition, and assume for
the moment that A = S. Assume that S is as in Proposition 1, and that it has the property that
any finitely definable set B contains a countable infinity of elements. This is clearly possible from
the construction in the proof of Proposition 1.
Define a stochastic process {h˜1, . . . , h˜n, . . .} where each random variable h˜n takes values in
the finite set {f1, . . . , fM}. Let H denote the set of all realizations of this process, and let P be
the probability distribution on H under which {h˜1, . . . , h˜n, . . .} are i.i.d. random variables with
distribution (p1, . . . , pM ). Notice that a realization h ∈ H of this process can be taken to be a
candidate for our f : S → {f1, . . . , fM}, so that the realized value hn of h˜n is the value assigned
to f(sn). We now proceed to show that the claim can be proved by setting f equal to any such
realization of this process in a set of probability 1.
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Let any h ∈ H be given and let B(m,h) be the set of states sn such that (sn ∈ B) and
(f(sn) = hn = fn). The law of large numbers holds for any B ∈ A in the following sense. There is
a set HB ⊂ H with P (HB) = 1 such that h ∈ HB implies that
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
n=1
χB(m,h)(sn) = pm µ(B). (A.3)
Since P (HB) = 1, clearly Q =
⋂
B∈AHB also has probability 1. Therefore Q 6= ∅. Now select any
element h = {h1, . . . , hn, . . .} of Q, and set f(sn) = hn for every n. This is our candidate f(·).
Since equation (A.3) holds for any B ∈ A it is obvious that f(·) satisfies finite invariance as in
Definition 7 over the whole of S. Again from the fact that equation (A.3) holds for any B ∈ A, it
is clear that f(·) has well defined frequencies as in Definition 5. Lastly, again from equation (A.3)
it is immediate that for any B ∈ A with µ(B) > 0 we must have that µ(Fi|B) = pi for every
i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, as required.
The argument for A ⊂ S is completely analogous to the one we have just given. The details are
therefore omitted.
Lemma A.1: Consider problem (12). Let Z be such that its characteristic function
f(s) =
{
1 if s ∈ Z
0 if s ∈ Z (A.4)
has well-defined frequencies, as in Definition 5. Let also f be finitely invariant over A ∈ A with
µ(A) > 0, as in Definition 7.
Let any finite contract t(·) ∈ F that is feasible in problem (12) be given, and {t1, . . . , tM} be
the range of t(·). Finally, for every i = 1, . . . ,M , let Ti be the inverse image of ti under t(·).
Assume now that t(·) has the following property. There exist an i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and a j ∈
{1, . . . ,M} such that µ(A ∩ Ti) > 0 and µ(A ∩ Tj) > 0. Then there exists another finite contract
t′(·) ∈ F that is constant over (A∩ Ti) ∪ (A∩ Tj), which is also feasible in problem (12) and which
yields a higher expected utility for agent 1.
Proof: Let t′(·) be the same as t(·) for every sn 6∈ (A ∩ Ti) ∪ (A ∩ Tj), and set
t′(sn) =
µ(Ti)ti + µ(Tj)tj
µ(Ti) + µ(Tj)
∀sn ∈ (A ∩ Ti) ∪ (A ∩ Tj) (A.5)
The claim now follows directly by concavity of V , defining U1 and U2 as in (1) and (2). The
rest of the details are omitted.
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Lemma A.2: Let Z be such that its characteristic function, as in (A.4), has well-defined frequencies
(as in Definition 5) and displays finite invariance (as in Definition 7) over the entire state space S .
Then an optimal finite contract t∗∗ that solves problem (12) exists unique, up to a set of states of
µ-measure zero. Moreover, t∗∗(sn) = 0 for all sn ∈ S, up to a set of states of µ-measure zero.
Proof: Let Z as in the statement of the Lemma be given. Consider now the following maximization
problem.
max
x
V (1 + x)µ(Z) + V (x)µ(Z)
s.t. V (−x)µ(Z) + V (1− x)µ(Z) ≥ V (0)µ(Z) + V (1)µ(Z)
x ∈ R
(A.6)
The strict concavity of V (·) implies that problem (A.6) has a unique solution by completely
standard arguments. Let this solution be denoted by x˜.
The expected utility V (−x)µ(Z) + V (1 − x)µ(Z) is monotonically decreasing in x. Therefore
the constraint in problem (A.6) is satisfied only when x ≤ 0. Since the objective function in problem
(A.6), V (1 + x)µ(Z) + V (x)µ(Z), is monotonically increasing in x we conclude that the unique
solution of problem (A.6) is x˜ = 0.
From Lemma A.1 above it is immediate that a solution to problem (A.6) must yield a solution
to problem (12). Therefore setting t∗∗(sn) = 0 for every sn ∈ S yields the unique (up to a set of
µ-measure zero) solution to problem (12).
Proof of Proposition 3: Let S be as in Proposition 1. Using Proposition 2 we can now choose Z
such that its characteristic function has well defined frequencies, displays finite invariance over the
whole of S and exhibits fine variability of degree 1 over S with µ(Z) ∈ (0, 1). The claim now follows
directly from Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.3: Let Aˆσ be the σ-algebra generated by the algebra Aˆ. For any finitely additive
measure λ on A there is a unique countably additive measure λˆ on Aˆσ such that for every Aˆ ∈ Aˆ
we have that λˆ(Aˆ) = λ(Aˆ ∩ S).
Proof: Let λˆ be the measure on Aˆ defined by λˆ(Aˆ) = λ(Aˆ ∩ S). Obviously, λˆ is a finitely additive
probability measure on Aˆ. The lemma claims that λˆ can be uniquely extended to a countably
additive measure on Aˆσ. The result follows from an application of the Kolmogorov Existence
Theorem (Billingsley 1979, p. 433). This result guarantees that the extension we seek exists as
required, provided that a consistency condition is satisfied.
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To define consistency formally, for any finite set of indices Y ≡ {y1, . . . , yn} ⊂ N, define AˆY ⊂
Aˆ to be the algebra of subsets of Sˆ generated by the features of a state in positions {y1, . . . , yn}.
Let λˆY denote the restriction of λˆ to AˆY . Consistency requires that for any two sets of indices Y
and Z such that Y ⊂ Z, λˆY is the marginal of λˆZ on AˆY . This is obviously satisfied because the
λˆY ’s are obtained as the restrictions of the finitely additive measure λˆ.
Proof of Proposition 4: Obviously, µ satisfies the assumption of Lemma A.3 and so it has a
unique countably additive extension, µˆ on Aˆσ.
To prove the second claim, for every A ∈ A let φ(A) ≡ µ(A ∩ Z). Note that φ is well defined
since we are assuming that Z has well defined frequencies. Clearly, φ is a finitely additive measure
on S and so Lemma A.3 applies again, yielding a unique countably additive measure φˆ on Aˆσ.
The desired function fˆ in the statement of the proposition (if it exists) must be the Radon-
Nikodym derivative of φˆ with respect to µˆ. For such derivative to exist, we must show that φˆ is
absolutely continuous with respect to µˆ. To prove the latter, we use a characterization of absolute
continuity in Shiryayev (1984). Define Aˆm to be the finite algebra of subsets of Sˆ generated by the
first m features of each state. Clearly Aˆm ⊂ Aˆm+1, and
⋃
m Aˆm generates Aˆσ. Define
zm(s) ≡ φˆ(Aˆm(s))
µˆ(Aˆm(s))
where Aˆm(s) is the smallest set in Aˆm containing s (this is well defined since Aˆm is a finite algebra).
It is known that the family of functions {zm}∞m=1 is a martingale under µˆ (Shiryayev 1984, p.
493), and thus converge µˆ-almost everywhere to a limiting function z∞ : Sˆ → R, measurable with
respect to Aˆσ. It is known (Shiryayev 1984, p. 493) that φˆ is absolutely continuous with respect to
µˆ if and only if φˆ({s : z∞(s) =∞}) = 0. To see this, note that since φˆ agrees with φ on every A ∈
Aˆm, using the definition of φ we immediately have that
zm(s) ≡ φˆ(Aˆm(s))
µˆ(Aˆm(s))
≤ 1
Thus, there is a uniform bound on the values of zm(s) for every s and m, so φˆ({s : z∞(s) =
∞}) = 0 as required.
In summary, φˆ is countably additive measure on Aˆσ that is absolutely continuous with respect
to µˆ. It follows, by the Radon-Nikodym theorem that there is a measurable function fˆ (unique up
to equivalence) such that for every Aˆ ∈ Aˆσ we have that φˆ(Aˆ) =
∫
Aˆ
fˆ dµˆ. This function clearly
satisfies all the required properties and hence the proposition is proved.
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Lemma A.4: A solution to the auxiliary problem (17) exists.
Proof: Let Vˆ ∗∗ be the supremum (clearly finite) of the maximand of problem (17) over the feasible
set.
Let {tˆn}∞n=1 be a sequence of bounded measurable functions Sˆ → R such that
lim
n→∞
∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆn(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆn(s)] dµˆ = Vˆ ∗∗ (A.7)
We first note that, passing to subsequences if necessary, if the sequence {tˆn}∞n=1 converges for
a set of s ∈ Sˆ of µˆ-measure 1, then the limit function, denoted tˆ, is measurable. Since {tˆn}∞n=1 is
bounded, the Dominated Convergence Theorem implies that
lim
n→∞
∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆn(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆn(s)] dµˆ =
∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆ(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆ(s)] dµˆ = Vˆ ∗∗
(A.8)
Hence, in this case there is nothing further to prove. So, it suffices to show that {tˆn}∞n=1 contains a
subsequence that converges in the sense above.
By way of contradiction, suppose that no subsequence of {tˆn}∞n=1 converges for a set of s ∈ Sˆ
of µˆ-measure 1. This implies that {tˆn}∞n=1 does not converge in measure. Hence, we can conclude
that there exists an  > 0 such that for every positive integer M there are n, m > M such that
µˆ{s ∈ Sˆ such that |tˆn(s)− tˆm(s)| > } >  (A.9)
Now let and n and m as in (A.9) be given. Using our assumptions on V (concavity and Inada) it is
now clear that if, for some λ ∈ (0, 1), we let t˜n,m(s) = λtˆm(s) + (1− λ)tˆn(s) for every s ∈ Sˆ, (A.9)
implies that there exists δ > 0 such that either∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + t˜n,m(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [t˜n,m(s)] dµˆ ≥
δ +
∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆm(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆm(s)] dµˆ
(A.10)
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or∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + t˜n,m(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [t˜n,m(s)] dµˆ ≥
δ +
∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆn(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆn(s)] dµˆ
(A.11)
or both must hold. But since n and m can be chosen arbitrarily large, (A.10) and (A.11) together
with the fact that δ > 0 clearly contradict (A.7).
Lemma A.5: Any solution to the auxiliary problem (17) satisfies the first order conditions specified
in Proposition 6 up to a set of states of µˆ-measure zero, and the reservation expected utility constraint
with equality.
Hence the solution to the auxiliary problem is in fact unique, up to a set of states of µˆ-measure
zero.
Proof: From Lemma A.4, we know that a solution to the auxiliary problem exists. The assertion
that the constraint in problem (17) must be satisfied with equality follows trivially from the state-
by-state monotonicity of the maximand and of the left-hand side of the constraint.
We now proceed by contradiction. Suppose now that there exists a set of states of positive
µˆ-measure over which (19) is violated in some solution tˆ∗∗ to problem (17). It follows from the
concavity of V , and from the fact that tˆ∗∗ must satisfy the constraint in (17) with equality, that
we can find two sets of states A′ and A′′ in Aˆ with µˆ(A′) > 0 and µˆ(A′′) > 0 which are such that,
whenever s′ ∈ A′ and s′′ ∈ A′′ we have that
fˆ(s′)V ′[1 + tˆ∗∗(s′)] + [1− fˆ(s′)]V ′[tˆ∗∗(s′)]
fˆ(s′)V ′[−tˆ∗∗(s′)] + [1− fˆ(s′)]V ′[1− tˆ∗∗(s′)] >
fˆ(s′′)V ′[1 + tˆ∗∗(s′′)] + [1− fˆ(s′′)]V ′[tˆ∗∗(s′′)]
fˆ(s′′)V ′[−tˆ∗∗(s′′)] + [1− fˆ(s′′)]V ′[1− tˆ∗∗(s′′)]
(A.12)
Next, define a new solution candidate as t˜∗∗ as follows. For every s ∈ Sˆ ∩A′∩A′′ let t˜∗∗(s) = tˆ∗∗(s).
For every s ∈ A′ set t˜∗∗(s) = tˆ∗∗(s) + , and for every s ∈ A′′ set t˜∗∗(s) = tˆ∗∗(s)− ξ, where  > 0 is
an arbitrarily small number and ξ is chosen so that∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [−t˜∗∗(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [1− t˜∗∗(s)] dµˆ =∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [−tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [1− tˆ∗∗(s)] dµˆ
(A.13)
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Using (A.12), the fact that  and ξ are chosen so that (A.13) holds, and the concavity of V , completely
standard arguments can now be used to show that∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + t˜∗∗(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [t˜∗∗(s)] dµˆ >∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆ∗∗(s)] dµˆ
(A.14)
Since (A.14) together with (A.13) clearly contradicts the assumption that tˆ∗∗ solves the auxiliary
problem (17) the proof is now complete.
Lemma A.6: Recall that V ∗∗ denotes the supremum of expected utility that agent 1 can achieve
with any finite contract, while Vˆ ∗∗ denotes the value of the maximand of the auxiliary problem (17)
under the (unique up to equivalence) optimal contract tˆ∗∗. Then V ∗∗ = Vˆ ∗∗.
Proof: To prove the claim, note that if V ∗∗ > Vˆ ∗∗, then we can find a finite contract t : S → R such
that its translation to the state space Sˆ improves on Vˆ ∗∗, immediately contradicting the definition
of Vˆ ∗∗. Hence V ∗∗ ≤ Vˆ ∗∗
Suppose now that V ∗∗ < Vˆ ∗∗. Since the solution to the auxiliary problem tˆ∗∗ is measurable, we
can find a finite contract tˆ : Sˆ → R that approximates tˆ∗∗ in the sense that
V ∗∗ <
∫
Sˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆ(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆ(s)] dµˆ < Vˆ ∗∗ (A.15)
However, (A.15) immediately implies that the translation to the state space S of the contract
tˆ : Sˆ → R yields an expected utility to agent 1 that exceeds V ∗∗. Since this contradicts directly the
definition of V ∗∗, the proof is now complete.
Proof of Proposition 5: A proof of 1 is not required since the claim is a direct consequence of
Lemmas A.4 and A.5.
To prove the sufficiency claim in 2, let tˆ∗∗ : Sˆ → R be a finite contract that solves the auxiliary
problem. Clearly, its translation t∗∗ : S → R to the state space S is feasible in the original problem,
and yields an expected utility to agent 1 equal to Vˆ ∗∗. But, by Lemma A.6 we know that Vˆ ∗∗ =
V ∗∗, and hence the claim is proved.
To prove the necessity claim in 2 assume that there is no finite contract that solves the auxiliary
problem, and that finite contract t∗∗ : S → R is a solution to the original problem. Clearly, the
translation of t∗∗ : S → R to the state space Sˆ — denoted tˆ∗∗ : Sˆ → R — is a finite contract that
is feasible in the auxiliary problem. Moreover, the value of the maximand of the auxiliary problem
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under tˆ∗∗ : Sˆ → R is V ∗∗. Hence, by Lemma A.6, the finite contract tˆ∗∗ : Sˆ → R solves the auxiliary
problem, establishing a contradiction.
To prove 3, it is sufficient to repeat the argument used in the proof of the sufficiency claim in 2
above.
To prove 4, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose then that for some optimizing sequence
{t∗∗n }∞n=1, some A in A and corresponding Aˆ ∈ Aˆ with µ(A) > 0, equation (18) is violated. Since
the sequence on the left-hand side of (18) is clearly bounded, passing to subsequences if necessary,
we can assume without loss of generality that the limit on the left-hand side of (18) is well defined
and (by the contradiction hypothesis) it is not equal to the right-hand side.
Notice that {t∗∗n }∞n=1 is an optimizing sequence of finite contracts with t∗∗n : S → R for every n.
Now consider a sequence of contracts {tˆn}∞n=1 with each tˆn : Sˆ → R being the translation of t∗∗n to
the state space Sˆ. Using Lemma A.6, we know that equation (A.7) holds for the sequence {tˆn}∞n=1.
Hence, exactly as in the proof of Lemma A.4, we know that there exists a subsequence {tˆnm}∞m=1
that converges pointwise on a set of states s ∈ Sˆ of µˆ-measure 1. Let t˜ : Sˆ → R be the limit of this
subsequence. Clearly, t˜ is measurable.
Next, observe that since {t∗∗n }∞n=1 is an optimizing sequence, using Lemma A.6, and the way
that t˜ has been constructed, we know that it must be a solution to the auxiliary problem.
Now recall that by our contradiction hypothesis there exists an A in A and corresponding Aˆ ∈
Aˆ with µ(A) > 0, such that the limit on left-hand side of (18) is well defined and is different from
the right-hand side. Because of the way we have constructed t˜, it is also clear that
lim
n→∞E[U1(t
∗∗
n )|A] =
1
µˆ(Aˆ)
∫
Aˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + t˜(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [t˜(s)] dµˆ (A.16)
Therefore, our contradiction hypothesis leads us to conclude that∫
Aˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + t˜(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [t˜(s)] dµˆ 6=∫
Aˆ
fˆ(s)V [1 + tˆ∗∗(s)] + [1− fˆ(s)]V [tˆ∗∗(s)] dµˆ
(A.17)
Hence t˜ and tˆ∗∗ differ on a set of positive µˆ-measure. However, since both t˜ and tˆ∗∗ are solutions to
the auxiliary problem this directly contradicts Lemma A.5. Hence the proof is now complete.
Proof of Proposition 6: The claim is proved in Lemma A.5.
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